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INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS AND
THE STATUTORY COMPLIANCE
"DEFENSE" TO INTENTIONAL TORT
LIABILITY
1. INTRODUCTION
A restaurateur is busy sifting through his mail, typically consisting
of bills and invoices, when he notices a letter sent from an individual.
The restaurateur's curiosity abounds as he opens the letter and reads
its contents. The sender claims to have been a patron of the restaurant
who had chosen that restaurant over all the other local restaurants to
celebrate a very special occasion, his first anniversary with his wife.
He alleges that after eating at the restaurant he became violently ill
from food poisoning. The sender implies that if you do not respond
accordingly, he will report you to the Better Business Bureau or the
Department of Health.' The restaurateur scrambles to uncover the
possible cause of the food poisoning by questioning the cooks, the
servers, the restaurant's vendors, and anyone else who may have
caused such discomfort to one of his patrons. He cannot sleep during
the following weeks, knowing that the possibility existed that his res-
taurant, his dream, may shut down as a result of this alleged incident.
A month later, after the restaurateur has tirelessly searched to un-
cover the cause of his patron's illness and suffered extreme stress, he
receives another letter from the same individual. This time, however,
the sender claims that he never ate at the restaurant, much less ever
became ill. Instead, the sender identifies himself as a researcher with
a major university who sent the letter describing the false incident of
illness to study the restaurateur's reaction. The researcher explains
that he sent the letter because he was conducting a study on how res-
taurateurs react to such incidents. Although profusely apologetic, the
researcher claims that he was compelled to make false claims to ob-
tain the best data for his study; only by making a false claim could he
See 164 Mulberry St. Corp. v. Columbia Univ., 771 N.Y.S.2d 16, 19 (App. Div. 2004).
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control any bias from restaurateurs, who might otherwise be inclined
to exaggerate their response to a food poisoning incident if they knew
they were responding to a hypothetical situation. After reading the
second letter, the restaurateur is furious. He spent countless hours
worrying and making excessive demands on his staff to uncover the
possible source of the incident that, in reality, was the product of a
researcher "conducting a study." He, like many of the restaurateurs
who were part of the study, asks himself, "How can someone get
away with this?" "Where does this researcher get the audacity to put
me through this, all for the so-called pursuit of science?"
These are facts analogous to a New York civil case, 164 Mulberry
Street Corp. v. Columbia University,2 in which a professor from Co-
lumbia Business School was accused of numerous tort claims, includ-
ing intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), for his recent
research study of vendor reactions.3 164 Mulberry Street presented a
novel issue; it was the first case in which a plaintiff claims IIED
against a social science researcher. The issues raised in this case im-
pact the bounds of social research, especially research projects in
which the informed consent requirement is either waived or altered.4
In addition, such a lawsuit could determine if Institutional Review
Boards (IRB) adequately protect human subjects from extreme and
outrageous behavior. The case also addresses the larger issue of
whether compliance with federal regulations can create a presumption
of the exercise of due care; and if so, what impact this presumption
should have on an intentional tort claim, including IIED. If a statutory
compliance defense can succeed to dismiss an IIED claim, then it is
imperative that compliance with the IRB protocol adequately protect
human subjects from extreme and outrageous conduct.
Researchers may believe that following federal protocol and pro-
cedures required to gain IRB approval would render them immune
from tort liability. This thought, however, has no merit, as statutory
compliance alone has never conclusively shielded a defendant from
liability. Federal regulations merely outline the requirements for IRBs
and contain a savings clause specifically stating that the policy does
not affect applicable state laws "which provide additional protections
to human subjects."6 Accordingly, compliance is not a complete de-
fense. However, this Note will argue that statutory compliance creates
2 id.
3 Id. at 18.
4 One must assume that in the research project conducted by Professor Flynn, the in-
formed consent requirement was not required under IRB protocol and, therefore, waived.
5 See infra Part Ill.A-B.
6 Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(f) (2005).
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a rebuttable presumption of an exercise of due care; therefore, statu-
tory compliance may be a "defense" to tort liability, including lIED.
This Note will first describe the facts of the 164 Mulberry Street
case and the issues raised by the plaintiffs in that case. It will then
describe the IRB, which federal legislation created to protect the in-
terests of human subjects during research projects; the statutory com-
pliance defense; and the cause of action for lIED. While both the IRB
and the judicial system are necessary to protect and provide safety for
the subjects of human research, this Note will argue that the two sys-
tems must work together. Absent care, judges performing a hindsight
analysis must not completely undermine the IRB process and hold
that a researcher who complied with the IRB regulations acted in a
manner that is intolerable to a civilized society. To prevent this con-
flict, the legal system must increase judicial deference to regulatory
standards, barring special circumstances, upon the finding of compli-
ance with the requisite regulations in an lIED case. Finally, this Note
will outline the analysis that courts should follow when facing an
lIED claim against a researcher who is required to comply with IRB
protocol. Previously, no social researcher had been accused of lIED;
therefore, such issues are unsettled.
This Note examines how a court should analyze the statutory com-
pliance defense when a researcher complied with the IRB regulations.
Under this circumstance, a finding of compliance creates a rebuttable
presumption of due care. Therefore, compliance is admissible as evi-
dence of the exercise of due care, absent circumstances that would
cause a reasonable person to take additional precautions.7 The next
step is for the court to determine if any circumstances existed that
would rebut the presumption of due care created by statutory compli-
ance. If the court determines that the researcher complied with the
IRB regulations and no such circumstances existed, the presumption
of care is not rebutted. And, because the presumption of an exercise
of due care is inconsistent with an lIED claim, an lIED claim cannot
prevail.
However, if the court determines that a researcher did comply with
the IRB regulations, but circumstances requiring additional care did
exist, the presumption of due care is rebutted. In this situation, the
court must consider a second prong before determining a researcher's
IIED liability. The court should ascertain if the accused researcher
acted as a reasonable researcher would in a similar situation. This
additional determination is an added judicial deference to the research
community and follows the precedent created by the Supreme Court,
7 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C cmt. a (1965).
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which has determined that additional precautions to statutory re-
quirements are only necessary when the situation calls for the reason-
able man to take such precautions.8 Therefore, this Note concludes
that only if the court determines that the researcher failed to follow
the IRB regulations or circumstances requiring additional care existed
and the researcher failed to act as a reasonable researcher, may the
court determine a claim for IIED under the traditional four-element
analysis. This analysis allows both the judicial system and the IRB to
protect human subjects, but also, eliminates the possible conflict be-
tween a court finding that a social research's conduct was extreme
and outrageous, yet fulfilled the requirements of the IRB, which is
intended to protect human subjects, that will arise if a court fails to
follow the prescribed analysis.
II. 164 MULBERRY STREET V. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
Francis Flynn, a Columbia Business School professor, sent false
complaint letters to various locally-owned Manhattan restaurants as
part of a social science research project designed to determine how
restaurateurs respond to customer complaints. In each letter, Flynn
claimed to have chosen the particular restaurant to celebrate his first
anniversary with his wife and that after dining at the restaurant, he
became violently ill. As an example, in one letter, Flynn claimed,
the symptoms began to appear about four hours after eating.
Extended nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and abdominal cramps
all pointed to one thing: food poisoning. It makes me furious
just thinking that our special romantic evening became re-
duced to my wife watching me curl up in a fetal position on
the tiled floor of our bathroom in between rounds of throwing
up.
9
Although the body of each letter slightly differed, each closed with:
"Although it is not my intention to file any reports with the Better
Business Bureau or the Department of Health, I want you, Mr. [res-
taurant owner], to understand what I went through in anticipation that
you will respond accordingly."'0 Flynn's research focused on how the
various restaurateurs would "respond accordingly." Flynn stated in
8 See Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 430-31 (1891) (discussing contributory
negligence of person killed by defendant railway company's train in negligence action).
9 Decision of Interest: Chez Josephine v. Columbia University, 228 N.Y. L.J. 22, 22
(2002) available at 12/19/2002 NYLJ 22.
to Id. (emphasis added).
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his testimony that "he did not intend to contact [the] regulatory au-
thorities," despite the implicit threat to do so. 1
About one month later, Professor Flynn sent a letter of apology to
each restaurateur and admitted the falsehood of the previous letter. He
explained in his second letter that "the [first] letter was fabricated to
help collect data for a research study that I designed concerning ven-
dor response to consumer complaints."'
12
The plaintiffs, various restaurateurs, filed a complaint against the
defendants, Columbia University and Professor Flynn, for various
torts including negligence, libel, libel per se, and IIED. 13 The case
settled out of court, but prior to the settlement, the court ruled on the
defendant's motion to dismiss the lIED claims and held that there was
a "sufficient basis to allow a jury to decide whether the conceded
conduct. . . was outrageous."'
14
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
A. History, Background, and Purpose of the IRB
Modern fundamental ethical standards were created in regards to
the conduct of research involving human subjects following the Nur-
emburg Trials.' 5 Judges, not legislatures, created these ethical stan-
dards during the criminal trials against the Nazi physicians who con-
ducted research on prisoners of war. The Nuremberg Code stood as
the research guidelines in the United States until 1974 when Congress
established the first federal guidelines, which since have been
amended several times.
16
11 164 Mulberry St. Corp. v. Columbia Univ., 771 N.Y.S.2d 16,24 (App. Div. 2004).
12 Id. at 19. In addition to receiving the subsequent letter from Professor Flynn, the owners
also received a letter from the Dean of the Columbia Business School apologizing for the ac-
tions of Professor Flynn and promising "to put into place procedures and guidelines for empiri-
cal research projects so that this will never happen again." Id. According to several members of
the University's IRB, Columbia University's IRB records are not available to the public, but
similar to most institutions, IRB approval is required for any research conducted by a university
employee. Telephone Interview with Shannon Serich, IRB Assistance, Columbia Univ. (Feb.
15, 2005).
13 164 Mulberry St., 771 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
14 Id. at 23.
Originally, there were two cases, 164 Mulberry St. and Josephine v. Columbia University,
2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3056 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't Mar. 14, 2003), which were con-
solidated into one case, 164 Mulberry St. After speaking with two attorneys who represented
Columbia University, George Davidson and Arthur Toback, I learned that the case had been
settled.
15 See Pedro F. Silva-Ruiz, The Protection of Persons in Medical Research and Cloning of
Human Beings, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 151,151 (Supp. 1998).
16 Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation:
Bridging the Gap Between Ethical Thought and Current Practice, 34 UCLA L. REV. 67, 71
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The purpose of the federal regulations is to protect the rights and
welfare of human research subjects by requiring (1) IRB approval of
qualifying research projects involving human subjects, (2) informed
consent of the subject,17 (3) verification that the design of the research
project is such that it could provide useful results for the good of so-
ciety, and (4) continual oversight and review by the IRB to ensure
that the study follows the guidelines. 8 The Code of Federal Regula-
tions lists the regulations for the protection of human research sub-
jects and stipulates that the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS)
shall by regulation require that ...any project or program
which involves the conduct of biomedical or behavioral re-
search involving human subjects submit in or with its applica-
tion for [a] grant, contract or cooperative agreement assur-
ances satisfactory to the Secretary that it has established ... a
board (to be known as an "Institutional Review Board") to
review biomedical and behavioral research involving human
subjects conducted at or supported by such entity in order to
protect the rights of the human subject of such research.' 9
In Chapter 21, section 56.102 of the Code of Federal Regulations, an
IRB is defined as "any board, committee, or other group formally
designated by an institution to review, to approve the initiation of, and
to conduct periodic review of, biomedical research involving human
subjects. The primary purpose of such review is to assure the protec-
tion of rights and welfare of the human subjects.,20 Because 42
U.S.C. § 289(a) requires an entity to establish an IRB when seeking
government research funds, most academic institutions have created
an IRB and established research protocols that require all research
projects, regardless of whether they receive federal funding, to go
through the IRB process if they involve human subjects.2 '
(1986).
17 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(c) (2005) (outlining factors that the IRB must find before ap-
proving a consent procedure in which the informed consent requirement is either waived or
altered).
18 See id. § 46.111 (2005) (outlining criteria that must be satisfied for IRB approval of re-
search).
19 42 U.S.C. § 289(a) (2005).
20 Institutional Review Boards Rules, 21 C.F.R. § 56.102(g) (2005) (emphasis added).
21 Harold Edgar & David Jonathan Rothman, The Institutional Review Board and Beyond:
Future Challenges to the Ethics of Human Experimentation, 73 MILBANK Q. 489, 490 (1995);
see also Telephone Interview with Shannon Serich, supra note 12.
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B. Outline of the Statutory Provisions
In addition to the establishment of IRBs, the Code of Federal
Regulations outlines who is required to gain IRB approval and in
what situations. The DHHS policy for protection of human subjects
"applies to all research involving human subjects conducted, sup-
ported or otherwise subject to regulation by any federal department or
agency which takes appropriate administrative action to make the
policy applicable to such research" 22 subject to listed exceptions that
include research involving surveys, observations, and interviews. 3
The Code further allows for state or local laws to provide heightened
protections for human subjects 24 and requires compliance with other
federal laws or regulations that may provide additional protection for
human subjects.25
The DHHS policy applies to most human research, including
almost all human research at a university. The Code defines research
as "a systematic investigation, including research development,
testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to
generalizable knowledge. Activities which meet this definition
constitute research for purposes of this policy, whether or not they are
conducted or supported under a program which is considered research
for other purposes., 26 Again, any qualifying program or project
engaged in human research must provide assurance to an IRB that the
researcher will protect the rights of the human subjects before it
27
commences the project.
Although the creation of an IRB is flexible, the Code outlines gen-
eral requirements and restrictions. An IRB must have "at least five
members, with varying backgrounds., 28 The board "shall be suffi-
ciently qualified through the experience and expertise of its members,
and the diversity of the members ... to promote respect for its advice
and counsel in safeguarding the rights and welfare of human sub-
jects.,,29 Furthermore, to create a diverse board based on background
and expertise, the Code states that the IRB shall include "at least one
member whose primary concern is in scientific areas and at least one
member whose primary concern is in the non-scientific areas. 3° In
22 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a).
23 Id. § 46.101(b).
24 Id. § 46.101(f).
25 Id. § 46.101(e).
26 Id. § 46.102(d).
27 Id. § 46.101.
28 Id. § 46.107(a).
29 Id.
30 Id. § 46.107(c).
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addition to the expertise and diversity requirements, the Code requires
that "the IRB shall be able to ascertain the acceptability of proposed
research in terms of institutional commitments and regulations, appli-
cable law, and standards of professional conduct and practice.' The
regulations place a practical requirement on the members to not only
understand the standards of ethical research and potential legal viola-
tions but also the ability to apply them to the research projects seek-
ing approval before the board. To minimize any possible conflict of
interest, "[e]ach IRB shall include at least one member who is not
otherwise affiliated with the [research] institution and who is not part
of the immediate family of a person who is affiliated with the institu-
tion. ''32 All other members of the IRB "may be staff members and
individuals who are, themselves, conducting clinical trials at the re-
search facility. 33 The IRB is able to enforce its decision because the
Code stipulates that the IRB has actual authority when reviewing pro-
posals to approve, modify, or disapprove research projects.34
C. Informed Consent
Additionally, the IRB functions to assure that the researcher did or
will gain informed consent from all human subjects. 35 The Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare defined informed consent in
1974 as "the knowing consent of an individual.., to be able to exer-
cise free power of choice without undue inducement or any element
of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or other form of constraint or coer-
cion.",36 Rather than adopting this or a different definition, the regula-
tions list eight basic elements of informed consent and six additional
optional elements that the IRB may consider when determining if the
researcher has met the informed consent requirement.37 Therefore,
under the current regulations, there is no specific or canonical defini-
tion for informed consent. The federal regulations require that a hu-
man subject be informed of the following: (1) "the purposes of the
research and the expected duration of the subject's participation...
[and] the procedures to be followed" and whether the procedures are
experimental; (2) the "foreseeable risks or discomforts to the subject";
31 Id. § 46.107(a).
32 Id. § 46.107(d).
33 Sharona Hoffman, Continued Concern: Human Subject Protection, the Institutional Re-
view Board, and Continuing Review, 68 TENN. L. REv. 725, 732 (2001).
- 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(a).
35 See Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 16, at 73 (describing this function as one of the
IRB's "principal tasks").
36 Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. 18,914, 18,917 (May 30, 1974) (to be codi-
fied at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
37 Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 16, at 73; see also 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1)-(8).
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(3) the benefits of the research to the subject or others; (4) the "ap-
propriate alternative procedures or courses of treatment" that may be
advantageous to the subject, if applicable; (5) the extent to which
records identifying the subject will remain confidential; (6) the com-
pensation offered or treatment available if injury occurs in "research
involving more than minimal risk"; (7) the name of a person whom
the subject may contact regarding the research, their rights as a re-
search subject, and what to do "in the event of a research-related in-
jury"; and (8) the voluntary nature of the program and the subject's
right to refuse to participate at any time during the research without
"loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled. '38 In spe-
cial situations, the IRB must also consider some additional elements
beyond those listed above to determine if the subject has been ade-
quately informed and consents.39
The main objectives of the informed consent doctrine are "(1) [t]o
promote individual autonomy; (2) to protect the patient subject's
status as a human being worthy of respect; (3) to avoid fraud and du-
ress; (4) to encourage self-scrutiny by the physician-researcher; (5)
to promote rational decision making; and (6) to involve the public in
important questions about health care policy and research. ' ' Never-
theless, there are certain situations in which the consent requirement
may be altered or waived by the IRB.41 An IRB has the power to ap-
prove an informed consent procedure that modifies or waives the
above listed elements of informed consent in limited research situa-
tions.42 The regulations permit informed consent to be altered or
waived if (1) "[t]he research involves no more than minimal risk to
the subjects, ' ' 3 (2) the subject's "rights and welfare" are not ad-
versely affected by the waiver or alteration, (3) "[t]he research could
not practicably be carried out without the waiver or alteration," and, if
appropriate, (4) information will be provided to the subject. 44 In addi-
tion, a researcher may be relieved from obtaining informed consent
38 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1)-(8).
39 Id. § 46.116(b)(1)-(6).
40 Hrobjartur Jonatansson, Iceland's Health Sector Database: A Significant Head Start in
the Search for the Biological Grail or an Irreversible Error?, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 31, 54
(2000); see also Alexander Morgan Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Re-
search and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 340 (1974) (listing functions of informed con-
sent).
41 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(c); see also Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 16, at 74.
42 Id. § 46.116(c)-(d).
43 Id. § 46.116(d)(l); see also id. § 46.102(i) (defining "minimal risk" as a level of risk
where "the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not
greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the per-
formance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests").
- Id. § 46.116(d)(2)-(4).
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from the subject if the research involves surveys, interviews, or ob-
servations of public behavior, unless the information "is recorded in
such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or
through identifiers linked to the subjects. ' 45 Deceptive research, a
style of research project in which the informed consent requirement is
waived, entails research that presents minimal risk and could not be
practicably carried out without the waiver.46 This type of research, or
any other that involves the alteration or waiver of the informed con-
sent requirement, is not without opposition, as many commentators
believe that such waivers of informed consent endanger the values
which the requirements intend to protect.47
D. Interests Protected by the IRB
The IRB process is a preventative system that analyzes each pro-
ject on a case-by-case basis and was created to protect human subjects
from harms caused by research. The process protects subjects by re-
quiring informed consent in most situations, and stipulating a rigorous
approval process to ensure respect for human subjects' rights, to pro-
tect their welfare, and to minimize harm.48 The regulations are capa-
ble of modifying research in an immediate manner since the IRB has
the authority to approve, disapprove, or modify any project before it
begins. When reviewing the proposal, the IRB attempts to balance the
benefit of a research project against the possible risks of harm to any
of the subjects and to confirm that all projects meet "applicable law
and standards of professional conduct and practice. ' '49 The IRB as-
sures that the subject's interests are adequately protected although
some minimal risks of harm may exist.50 Therefore, the federal regu-
lations, although flexible, provide significant protection to human
subjects through the rigorous framework and requirements a re-
searcher seeking to conduct research involving human subjects must
follow.
45 Id. § 45.101(b)(2).
46 See Rebecca S. Dresser, Deception Research and the HHS Final Regulations, IRB: Eth-
ics and Human Research, Apr. 1981, at 3, 3-4 (stating that some deception research will be
exempt from informed consent under 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b), although §46.116(d) will recapture
the requirement in many situations).
47 See Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 16 at 77-78 (discussing the troublesome nature of
"deception research").
48 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a).
49 Id.
50 See id. § 46.117(c)(2) (stating that the "IRB may waive the requirement for the investi-
gator to obtain a signed consent form for some or all subjects if it finds ... [t]hat the research
presents no more than minimal risk of harm to subjects and involves no procedures for which
written consent is normally required outside of the research context").
[Vol. 56:3
IRBS & THE STATUTORY COMPLIANCE DEFENSE
IV. THE STATUTORY COMPLIANCE DEFENSE
A. The "Defense " as a Presumption Created by Compliance
At common law, an individual's compliance with applicable statu-
tory requirements did not act as a defense to nonstatutory tort liabil-
ity. 5' The rationale against the statutory compliance defense was par-
tially based on the notion that regulations only established a minimum
floor of acceptable conduct, which is not sufficient to immunize a
defendant from liability.52 The Restatement (Second) of Torts (the
"Restatement") had a slightly different view than the common law
when it stated that "[w]here there are no such special circumstances,
the minimum standard prescribed by the legislation or regulation may
be accepted by... the courts as a matter of law, as sufficient for the
occasion. 53
Numerous courts have subsequently adopted the view articulated
in the Restatement by holding that compliance with a government
statute or regulation is admissible as evidence of the defendant's ex-
ercise of due care, rather than conclusive proof of nonnegligence.54 In
Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Ives, 5 the Supreme Court held that a
defendant must exercise more than the care required by the statute
where circumstances are present that would cause the reasonable man
to take additional precautions.56 Therefore, courts have interpreted
statutory compliance not as a true affirmative defense but rather as a
factor to consider when determining tort liability because it creates a
rebuttable presumption of an exercise of due care. 5 This presumption
cannot be a complete defense, because similar to common law, the
minimal exercise of care created by compliance is not a sufficient
defense to all tort claims, as some situations may require a defendant
to exceed the minimal standard of care presumption created by statu-
tory compliance. 58 Furthermore, even if a court determines that a de-
51 Paul Dueffert, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 175, 175 (1989).
52 See, e.g., Smith v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 814 F.2d 1481, 1487 (10th Cir. 1987); S. Pac.
R.R. v. Mitchell, 292 P.2d 827, 832-33 (Ariz. 1956).
53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C cmt. a (1965).
54 See Dueffert, supra note 51, at 175; see also, e.g., Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655
F.2d 650, 656 (5th Cir. 1981); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Nutt, 407 A.2d 606, 610 (D.C. App.
1979); Leonard v. Sav-A-Stop Servs., Inc., 424 A.2d 336, 340 (Md. 1981); Kemp v. Wis. Elec.
Power Co., 172 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Wis. 1969).
15 144 U.S. 408 (1892).
56 Id. at 427.
57 See Dueffert, supra note 51, at 175.
58 See Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1028 (1st Cir. 1973); S. Pac. R.R.
v. Mitchell, 292 P.2d 827, 834 (Ariz. 1956).
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fendant raising the statutory compliance "defense" did comply with
the regulations, this rebuttable presumption can be extinguished if the
court finds that circumstances exist in which a reasonable person
would have taken additional precautions.59
Since the statutory compliance defense requires a defendant to
comply with the applicable regulations, the court must first determine
if the defendant actually complied with the regulations and thus cre-
ated the rebuttable presumption of an exercise of due care. If the de-
fendant did comply, the nonmoving party must then demonstrate that
circumstances existed in which a reasonable person would have taken
additional precautions and therefore demand that the defendant act
with a higher standard of due care than the presumed level of care
created by compliance with the regulation.6° In a situation where such
circumstances exist, the exercise of due care can only be found where
a reasonable man would not have taken additional precautions.6'
When such circumstances do not exist and a court holds that a de-
fendant did comply with the applicable regulations, the presumption
of a minimal care is created and not rebutted, thus constituting evi-
dence of the defendant's exercise of due care. The Restatement and
the courts have not only articulated this argument, but some state leg-
islatures have recommended that the courts establish a presumption
that regulatory compliance suffices to illustrate a defendant's exercise
of due care.62
B. Statutory Compliance Defensive Evidence
Regarding Intentional Torts
Typically, the statutory compliance defense is raised in negligence
or strict liability cases, with the most common instance being personal
injury lawsuits.63 In Smith v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,64 a rock falling
from the roof of a mine injured a coal miner. The Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that because the federal Mine Safety and Health Ad-
ministration had approved the specific mine, it was proper to intro-
duce evidence of the agency's approval because it was relevant in
59 Ives, 144 U.S. at 430.
60 See id. (requiring additional precautions only when unusual circumstances are present
and call for the reasonable man to take such precautions); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 288C cmt. a (1965).
61 Ives, 144 U.S. at 430.
62 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(1)(b) (1989 & Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3304(a), (c) (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (1980 & Supp. 1995).
63 See Dueffert, supra note 51, at 188.
-4 814 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1987).
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determining whether the mining company met at least a minimum
standard of care due.65
The presumption of an exercise of due care based on statutory
compliance extends beyond personal injury lawsuits to product liabil-
ity suits. Most modem examples of the statutory compliance defense
involve cases in which plaintiffs allege defective design or defective
labeling against manufacturers. 66 Regardless of the claims, most
courts allow the defendant to introduce compliance as evidence of an
exercise of due care, though regulatory compliance does not com-
pletely shield the defendant from tort liability.
67
Although the statutory defense is not typically invoked as a de-
fense to intentional torts cases, the presumption of statutory compli-
ance as evidence of an exercise of due care is nonetheless the same
with an intentional tort as with negligence or strict liability claims.
Similar to negligence or strict liability lawsuits, if the court deter-
mines that a defendant complied with the relevant federal regulations,
the rebuttable presumption of due care will be created, regardless of
the fact that it is an intentional tort suit.
68
V. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
A. Elements of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Second Restatement of Torts established the common stan-
dard for lIED when it articulated that "[o]ne who by extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emo-
tional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional dis-
tress. ' ,6 9 Almost every jurisdiction, including New York, has adopted
this standard for IIED.70 The New York Court of Appeals has held
that the following are the required elements of lIED: (1) the defendant
65 Id. at 1487.
66 See Dueffert, supra note 51, at 193; see, e.g., Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d
653 (Cal. 1973); Hill v. Husky Briquetting, Inc., 220 N.W.2d 137 (Mich. Ct. App.), affd, 223
N.W.2d 290 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1324 (Or.
1978) (en banc).
67 See Dueffert, supra note 51, at 214.
68 In an lIED claim, if a court finds that a researcher exercised due care, his conduct could
not be extreme and outrageous. Although the researcher is aware that he may cause emotional
distress, IRB compliance indicates that the 1RB did not conclude that the conduct was so egre-
gious.
69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
70 Fischer v. Maloney, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (N.Y. 1978); see also Christopher v. Har-
bury, 536 U.S. 403, 428 (2002); Green v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 667 F.2d 22, 24 (9th Cir.
1982); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 819 (Cal. 1993); Wiehe v. Kukal,
592 P.2d 860, 862 (Kan. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
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must act intentionally or recklessly, 7' (2) the conduct must be extreme
and outrageous, (3) the conduct must be the cause of the emotional
distress, and (4) there must be emotional distress.7 Commentators
have generally agreed that the key to an IIED claim is meeting the
extreme and outrageous requirement.73 Some have gone as far as stat-
ing that if a plaintiff meets this single element, a finding of extreme
and outrageous conduct imputes the other elements.74 Therefore, if a
defendant's conduct is extreme and outrageous, a court is likely to
imply the causation and distress elements as a result of the outrageous
nature of the conduct.75 Additionally, based on the circumstances of
the conduct, a court may also imply that the conduct was intentional
by the same rationale, since the conduct goes beyond "all possible
bounds of decency. 76 Accordingly, as a plaintiff may prevail on an
IIED claim by simply proving that the defendant's conduct was ex-
treme and outrageous, understanding how courts define extreme and
outrageous behavior is essential to defending an IIED claim.
B. Defining "Extreme and Outrageous " Behavior
The American Law Institute in the Second Restatement articulated
a proscribed standard that defined extreme and outrageous conduct in
the following manner:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts
1' See Garland v. Herrin, 724 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1983) (interpreting the holding of
Fischer by stating that although the New York Court of Appeals adopted the Restatement's
formulation of the intentional infliction of emotional distress, there is no authority indicating
that New York law is "imposing on a defendant liability for inflicting emotional distress 'reck-
lessly,' though not 'intentionally').
72 Murphy v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983); see also Garland, 724
F.2d 16; Fischer, 373 N.E.2d 1215; Burba v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 456 N.Y.S.2d 578
(App. Div. 1982).
73 See, e.g., Frank J. Cavico, The Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in the
Private Employment Sector, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 116 (2003); Dennis P. Duffy,
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment at Will, 74 B.U. L. REv. 387, 393
(1994).
74 Duffy, supra note 73.
75 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965) (contributing that "[s]evere dis-
tress must be proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's
conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed").
76 See, e.g., Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 480 N.E.2d 349 (N.Y. 1985); Murphy, 448 N.E.2d
86; Fischer, 373 N.E.2d 1215; Gordon v. Roche Lab., 455 N.Y.S.2d 785 (App. Div. 1982);
Burba, 456 N.Y.S.2d 578.
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to an average member of the community would arouse his
resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
"Outrageous!
77
Countless courts articulate this definition of extreme and outrageous
behavior when holding a defendant liable for IIED.78 Besides restat-
ing this definition, however, few courts have proffered a clearer defi-
nition of extreme and outrageous conduct or any insight as to the fac-
tors considered in making its determination.
In a law review article dissecting lIED, Daniel Givelber stated that
the tort fails to define the proscribed conduct beyond suggesting that
it is very bad. "The term [extreme and outrageous]. . . does not
objectively describe an act or series of acts; rather, it represents an
evaluation of behavior., 79 Prosser stated that such a broad definition
will open the floodgates to litigation and therefore reasons that the
purpose of the extreme and outrageous requirement is to prevent
"petty insult, indignity, annoyance or threat" and to provide "the
necessary assurance that the asserted mental distress is genuine. 8°
Not surprisingly, because the definition of extreme and outrageous
does not outline specific behaviors, courts have been scattered and
inconsistent in their findings of conduct that reaches the level of
extreme and outrageous.81
C. Statutory Compliance as Defensive Evidence in an lIED Case
Statutory compliance is not typically a defense in lIED cases, but
there are similar "defenses" that entail the presumption of meeting a
standard of care created by compliance with a federal regulation. In
Melorich Builders v. San Bernardino County,82 a California Court of
Appeals stated that a contractor who acted in reliance on the judgment
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d. (1965) (emphasis added); see also
Freihofer, 480 N.E.2d 349; Murphy, 448 N.E.2d 86; Fisher, 373 N.E.2d at 1217.
78 See Annotation, Modern Status of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as Inde-
pendent Tort; "Outrage, " 38 A.L.R.4th 998, § 3 (2005).
79 Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhanded-
ness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLuM. L. REv.
42,51 (1982).
80 William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40,44 (1956).
S See, e.g., Mathie v. Fries, 935 F. Supp. 1284 (E.D.N.Y 1996), affd in part, remanded
in part, 121 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1997) (allowing recovery for emotional distress in sexual abuse or
sodomy cases); Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 770 (N.Y. 1970) (holding that
"deliberate and malicious campaign of harassment or intimidation" is intolerable conduct and
allowed a plaintiff to recover for lIED); Roach v. Stem, 675 N.Y.S.2d 133 (App. Div. 1998)
(holding that a plaintiff could recover for lIED for the mishandling of human remains); Green v.
Fischbein, 522 N.Y.S.2d 529 (App. Div. 1987) (granting a tenant recovery against his property
owner for repetitive, baseless lawsuits).
82 207 Cal. Rptr. 47 (Ct. App. 1984).
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of a professional could "hardly be said to be extreme or outrageous
even though the . . . advice later proved to be . . . unsound., 83 The
court made numerous rationales for dismissing the lIED claim as a
matter of law against the contractor including the technical nature of
the stop notice, the strict statutory compliance requirements to utilize
such a lien, and the policy reason for not discouraging a businessman
to follow the advice of his attorney. The court narrowed the holding
by stating that a defendant can raise a defense against an lIED claim
of extreme and outrageous conduct if the evidence shows "(1) the
defendant acted on the opinion and advice of counsel; (2) counsel's
advice was based on full disclosure of all the facts by the defendant
... ; and (3) the defendant's reliance on the advice of counsel was in
good faith.,8 4 The court set a precedent of allowing people the ability
to rely in good faith on the advice and judgment of professionals and
not fear IED liability. In those situations, the court ruled that the
conduct could not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous.
Although Melorich Builders specifically entails reliance on the ad-
vice of legal counsel, the same analysis can be used in a situation
where a researcher relies on the approval of the IRB and complied
with the federal regulations. His reliance on IRB approval creates an
analogous scenario to that of the contractor in Melorich Builders.
Because compliance is determined after the fact, there will be a de-
termination of whether the researcher made full disclosure of all the
facts during the IRB approval process and whether the researcher
relied in good faith on the advice of the IRB. Therefore, the court
should follow the same standard to allow researchers the presumption
that it acted with the appropriate care since the researcher relied on
the approval of the IRB. In both situations, the court is conducting an
ex post analysis to determine whether the defendant followed the
mandate of the IRB and complied with federal regulations in order to
determine if the defendant's conduct could rise to the level of utterly
intolerable in society.
The presumption of due care created by statutory compliance, or
reliance on a professional as in Melorich Builders, indicates that
unless the presumption of due care is rebutted, a court cannot hold
that the conduct rose to the level of extreme and outrageous. 85 Al-
though the presumption is only that the defendant exercised the
minimal standard of care, this level is inconsistent with that required
83 Id. at 50 (noting that in relying on the advice of his attorney, a contractor filed a stop
notice against his client, and the client subsequently sued him for numerous causes of action,
including lIED).
84 Id.
85 Id.
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by an IIED claim of extreme and outrageous conduct. Therefore, the
statutory compliance defense will protect a defendant from IED li-
ability by the showing that the defendant's conduct was at least a
minimal exercise of due care.
VI. Is IRB COMPLIANCE A "DEFENSE" TO IIED?
The case involving Professor Flynn was a case of first impression,
in which the subjects of a human research project brought claims of
IIED against a social researcher. Although the court did not find the
researcher liable, before the case settled, the court did hold that there
was sufficient support of extreme and outrageous behavior by the
researcher to allow a jury to determine if the defendant was liable for
IIED.86
Based on federal regulations, approval by the IRB is required be-
fore a researcher can commence any qualifying project involving hu-
man subjects. It is under this backdrop that the New York Supreme
Court in 164 Mulberry Street v. Columbia University could have had
the opportunity to set the standard for how to analyze a situation in
which a researcher, who must comply with IRB regulations, is alleged
to have caused IED. Although the defense has not been raised yet,
this Note will consider the possible statutory compliance "defense" by
a researcher to an lIED claim.
If a similar case should ever reach the court, such court must un-
derstand that it needs to increase judicial deference to IRB regulations
in order to minimize any possible conflict between the federal regula-
tions and the judicial system. Otherwise, a court may determine that a
defendant complied with the IRB regulations, yet acted in such a
manner as to be utterly intolerable to society and therefore liable for
IIED. With such a ruling, the court will indirectly hold that the IRB
cannot adequately protect human subjects from even extreme and
outrageous conduct.
A. Approval Versus Compliance: The Judicial Determination
The IRB approval process plays a major role in protecting the
safety and liberties of human subjects, but courts can provide addi-
tional protection and therefore, must be used to increase protection of
human subjects. Conflict between the two systems would arise if a
court were to undermine the IRB regulatory process by holding that a
86 164 Mulberry St. Corp. v. Columbia Univ., 771 N.Y.S.2d 16, 23 (App. Div. 2004).
Knowing that all human subject research studies at Columbia require IRB approval, this Note
assumes Professor Flynn must have received IRB approval.
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project both complied with the federal IRB regulations yet was utterly
intolerable in a civilized community.
At this point, it is imperative to understand the difference between
approval and compliance with IRB regulations. When a researcher
applies to his institution's IRB and that IRB grants the researcher the
authority to commence the project, the researcher has gained ap-
proval. An IRB grants approval based on the requirements outlined in
the federal regulations.87 Compliance is different because it is an ex
post analysis to determine if the researcher actually complied with the
federal regulations by evaluating a researcher's IRB submission and
how he conducted his research.88 A researcher's approval by an IRB
is a factor in determining compliance, but is not per se compliance. 89
When a researcher raises the statutory compliance defense, the court
must evaluate the researcher's submission and his conduct during the
study before holding that he either complied or failed to comply with
IRB regulations.
B. IRB Compliance Is a Presumption of an Exercise of Due Care
The statutory compliance defense stems back to 1892, when the
Supreme Court ruled in Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Ives that a de-
fendant may be liable for negligence though he fully complied with
the applicable regulations.9" The Court added a caveat when it im-
plied that regulatory compliance is evidence of due care and may be
sufficient for the circumstances unless extraordinary circumstances
are present in the case and the reasonable person would have taken
additional precautions.9' The Restatement adopted precisely this posi-
tion: absent special circumstances, the court as a matter of law may
accept the minimum standard prescribed by the legislation as suffi-
cient for the occasion.92 Therefore, under Ives and the Restatement,
IRB compliance by a researcher implies an exercise of due care, ab-
sent circumstances in which a reasonable person would take addi-
tional precautions.
87 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2005).
88 By determining compliance through an ex post analysis, the court will likely uncover
any information that the researcher withheld during the IRB approval process and determine if
the researcher conducted the study in accordance with any IRB requirements and the IRB regu-
lations.
89 See 42 U.S.C. § 289(a) (2000) (stating that any qualifying research project must have
IRB approval before commencing and therefore a researcher that fails to gain IRB approval will
not comply with the federal IRB regulations).
- 144 U.S. 408, 420-21 (1892).
91 Id.
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C cmt. a (1965).
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Since compliance with IRB regulations is at least evidence of sat-
isfying a minimal standard of care where circumstances requiring
additional care do not exist, compliance is only evidence in certain
situations. In other words, IRB compliance creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption of an exercise of due care, which can be rebutted by the
showing of the existence of circumstances in which a reasonable per-
son would take additional precautions. Thus, IRB compliance triggers
a presumption that a researcher exercised due care towards his sub-
jects, but the showing of such circumstances requiring additional care
will extinguish the presumption.
Such a circumstance arises, for example, when an IRB approves a
research project in which the informed consent requirement is either
altered or waived and therefore the safety of the subject lies solely in
the hands of the IRB and the researcher because the subject may not
be capable of protecting himself. In this situation, the study creates a
significantly higher potential harm to the subject because of his lost
autonomy than compared to a study where a subject grants an in-
formed consent. Since there could be significant harm to the subject,
the court should apply a per se rule that a circumstance in which a
reasonable researcher would take additional precautions exists in all
situations where the informed consent requirement is either altered or
waived by the IRB. This analysis will allow the court to make addi-
tional determinations before holding that a researcher exercised due
care. Although the waiver or alteration complies with the regulations,
the subject may not have been capable of protecting or dismissing
himself from the study and, therefore, the court should not bar recov-
ery without evaluating the researcher's conduct against that of a rea-
sonable researcher in a similar situation. Therefore, any alteration or
waiver of informed consent indicates the existence of a circumstance
requiring the court to take an additional step to determine the re-
searcher's level of care towards the human subject.
C. Exercise of Due Care by a Researcher and an lED Claim
To prevail on an lIED claim, the court must find that the defen-
dant's conduct was "extreme and outrageous. 93 The conduct pro-
tected by lIED includes acts that go beyond "all possible bounds of
decency, and [are] to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable
in a civilized community., 94
93 Fisher v. Maloney, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (N.Y. 1978) (discussing conduct that is "ex-
treme and outrageous" (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965))).
94 Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 90 (N.Y. 1983) (emphasis added).
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Can conduct that is utterly intolerable in a civilized community
comply with federal regulations created to ensure safety for human
research subjects? Can a researcher who complies with IRB regula-
tions act in such an atrocious manner? When a defendant exercises
due care, an lIED claim cannot survive because such care is inconsis-
tent with the extreme and outrageous conduct required by an lIED
claim. Thus, if a researcher provides evidence of compliance with the
IRB regulations, there is a rebuttable presumption of an exercise of
due care.95 This presumption may be a defense to an lIED claim,
unless it is rebutted as a result of the existence of circumstances in
which a reasonable researcher would have exercised additional care
because due care cannot be extreme and outrageous.96 Although soci-
ety may want a defendant to act in a manner above the standard of
care created by compliance, the exercise of due care cannot be ex-
treme and outrageous.
Many courts, especially those in New York, have a strict applica-
tion of the outrageous element.97 Therefore, absent rebuttal of the
presumption of due care by a defendant, statutory compliance would
clearly be a defense to an lIED claim because acting with due care
makes the alleged conduct not sufficiently outrageous. Furthermore,
the Second Circuit has held that outrageous conduct lacking "any
reasonable justification" fails to meet the extreme and outrageous
element. 98 When he gains IRB approval, a researcher is clearly justi-
fied to act in reliance on that approval unless he acts in bad faith,99
(for example, by lying about his project to the IRB). Therefore such
conduct cannot meet the extreme and outrageous element under the
Second Circuit standard either. If a researcher can prove that he exer-
cised due care towards his subject, an lIED suit cannot survive.
95 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C cmt. a (1965) (stating that "[w]here there
are no special circumstances, the minimum standard prescribed by the legislation or regulation
may be accepted by... the court as a matter of law, as sufficient for the occasion").
96 Melorich Builders, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of San Bernardino County, 207 Cal. Rptr. 47, 49-
50 (Ct. App. 1984).
97 See Gay v. Carlson, 60 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting "that New York courts have
been 'very strict' in applying [lIED] elements" (citing Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212,
220 (2d Cir. 1985))); see also Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121-22 (1993) (stating
that the extreme and outrageous "requirements... are rigorous, and difficult to satisfy" (citing
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 12, at 60-61 (5th ed. 1984))).
98 Martin, 762 F.2d at 220.
99 See, e.g., Melorich Builders, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50 (asserting that it is a complete de-
fense of extreme and outrageous conduct when the defendant relied, after full disclosure, on
counsel's advice in good faith).
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D. The Judicial Analysis to Determine a Researcher's
Liability in an lIED Claim
If a researcher raises the statutory compliance defense, he will
have the burden of proving compliance with the federal regulations,
as do almost all defendants when raising a defense or rebuttable pre-
sumption. If the court concludes that the researcher complied with the
regulations, it creates the rebuttable presumption that he exercised
due care. If the court concludes that the researcher complied and fails
to find any circumstances that would cause a reasonable researcher to
provide additional care, it must dismiss the suit because an IIED suit
cannot prevail. In this scenario, where no circumstances requiring
additional care are present, the presumption, if created by statutory
compliance, cannot be rebutted because the researcher's compliance
is evidence that he exercised due care and an lIED claim cannot pre-
vail where a researcher exercised due care. Again, the presumption of
due care is rebuttable by showing the existence of circumstances in
which a reasonable researcher would have taken additional precau-
tions. If a reasonable person would have taken additional precautions,
the presumption has been rebutted as compliance is not necessarily
evidence of due care.
In a situation where informed consent was waived, there is a per se
presence of such circumstances where a reasonable researcher should
take additional precautions. °° Therefore, if the IRB either altered or
waived informed consent, the social researcher's compliance with the
federal regulations is not evidence of due care because the presence of
circumstances requiring additional precautions rebuts the presump-
tion. In this situation, the court must make a determination in addition
to compliance, by evaluating whether the researcher's conduct to pro-
tect the subject equates to the reasonable researcher. A researcher has
a duty to act in a manner to minimize the harm toward the subject and
to provide additional protection to ensure that harm is minimized.
Therefore, comparing the conduct of the accused researcher to that of
a reasonable researcher in a similar circumstance, the court will con-
clude whether the researcher acted in such a manner as to protect the
subjects from such circumstances or whether a reasonable researcher
would have taken additional precautions to protect the subject.
When circumstances exist that would cause a reasonable re-
searcher to take additional precaution, the analysis to determine if the
researcher exercised due care requires the court to determine (1)
whether the researcher complied with the federal regulations, and if
100 See supra Part III.A-B.
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so, (2) whether the reasonable researcher in his position would have
acted in a similar manner. If the court determines that the researcher
both complied with the federal IRB regulations and acted in a similar
manner as a reasonable researcher in his position, the court must hold
that the conduct was not extreme and outrageous. Thus, the court will
bar recovery for an IED claim since the researcher exercised due care
towards the subject although such circumstances were present. If the
researcher complied with federal regulations and acted as a reason-
able researcher in his position, the conduct cannot be considered ex-
treme and outrageous.
On the contrary, if the court determines that the researcher failed
to comply with the IRB regulations or, where circumstances exist
requiring the researcher to take additional care, and the researcher
failed to act as a reasonable researcher, the court must hold that the
statutory compliance defense fails, as the researcher has not proffered
evidence of due care. The court must then apply the traditional lIED
analysis to determine the researcher's liability.' ' Failure to comply
with the regulations or act as a reasonable researcher does not demon-
strate all of the elements of an lIED claim and therefore cannot be a
per se finding of lIED liability. lIED requires that a plaintiff suffer
emotional distress and that the conduct of the defendant caused his
emotional distress. A researcher who failed to comply with IRB regu-
lations or act as a reasonable researcher does not, without more evi-
dence, demonstrate that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress or
that the acts of the researcher were the cause of the plaintiff s distress.
Therefore, in an IIED case where the court rejects a defendant's statu-
tory compliance defense because the researcher failed to comply with
the IRB regulations or failed to act as a reasonable researcher, the
court must still determine if the researcher's conduct was extreme and
outrageous and goes beyond all possible bounds of decency.
Only under this analysis, can the courts and the federal regulations
work in harmony to protect the rights of human subjects. If a court
holds a researcher liable for lIED, though he complied with the
federal regulations, Congress must amend the IRB regulations so that
conduct that a society finds utterly intolerable does not comply with a
regulation intended to protect human subjects. 0 2 The same result and
101 Fisher v. Maloney, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (N.Y. 1978) (outlining the four elements of
intentional infliction of emotional distress as the defendant must act intentionally or recklessly,
the conduct must be extreme and outrageous, the conduct must be the cause of the emotional
distress, and there must be emotional distress).
102 In making an amendment to the IRB regulations, Congress can either (a) change the
IRB standards to prevent this type of conduct from being approved or (b) direct the courts that a
researcher who complies with IRB standards is not liable for lIED. This Note does not address
this determination.
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immediate action by Congress must occur if a court holds that a
researcher who altered or waived the informed consent but complied
with the federal regulations and acted as a reasonable researcher is
liable for lIED. The IRB protocol was implemented to protect human
subjects and any system that approves extreme and outrageous
behavior cannot adequately protect human subjects. Furthermore, if a
reasonable researcher would have acted in such an intolerable
manner, the regulations on the research community must be increased
to create a higher level of care by the research community towards
human subjects.
E. Application of the Required Analysis for an lIED Claim in
164 Mulberry Street v. Columbia University
In the case against Francis Flynn and Columbia University, the re-
searcher was conducting a project to study various restaurateurs' re-
sponses to consumer complaints by submitting fictitious letters. After
going through varying hardships, the vendors filed numerous law-
suits, including IIED. Because federal IRB regulations govern Flynn,
he was able to raise the statutory compliance defense as evidence of
his exercise of due care and thus eliminate a claim for lIED against
him. 103
If Flynn had raised the statutory compliance defense, the court
should have followed the aforementioned analysis or have been pre-
pared to articulate a ruling that the current federal IRB regulations are
not sufficient safeguards to protect human subjects from extreme and
outrageous behavior. The court had already denied the defendants
motion to dismiss the subjects' lIED claims by stating that there was
a sufficient basis to conclude that the conduct was outrageous, though
the court did state a "willingness to revisit" the issue at a later stage of
the trial. 1°4
Compliance with the IRB regulations raises a rebuttable presump-
tion that a researcher exercised due care. If Flynn raised the statutory
compliance defense, he would have had the burden of proving he
complied with the IRB regulations. In addition, because his project
entailed deceitful research, which includes a waiver of the informed
consent requirement, there was a per se existence of a circumstance
requiring additional precautions. Such a circumstance rebuts the pre-
sumption of due care, though Flynn could have proffered evidence
103 There is no evidence to indicate that Professor Flynn or Columbia University ever
raised such a defense to the lIED claims.
104 164 Mulberry St. Corp. v. Columbia University, 771 N.Y.S.2d 16, 22 (App. Div. 2004).
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that his conduct complied with that of a reasonable researcher in his
situation, as such evidence shows an exercise of due care.
In a situation where a circumstance exists requiring additional
care, such as this, the court must conduct a two-prong analysis before
making a determination of liability for an lIED claim. The court first
would have had to determine: (1) if Flynn complied with the federal
IRB regulations, and if so, (2) whether he acted as a reasonable re-
searcher would have in his situation. Only if the court determined that
Flynn either failed to comply with the federal regulations or did not
act as a reasonable researcher would the court have been able to de-
termine whether his conduct reached the level of extreme and outra-
geous.105
VII. CONCLUSION
If an analogous case of 164 Mulberry Street goes to trial, the court
will have an opportunity to set the proper analysis on how courts must
determine lIED liability when a party raises a statutory compliance
defense. Although the statutory compliance defense does not provide
complete immunity for a researcher who complied with IRB regula-
tions, the defense may create a rebuttable presumption of an exercise
of due care. Generally, the statutory compliance defense is only raised
in negligence or strict liability cases, but the defense can protect a
researcher from IIED liability by indicating an exercise of due care.
With the showing that a defendant exercised due care, a court cannot
hold that his conduct reached the level of extreme and outrageous
behavior; such conduct goes beyond all bounds of decency within
society and clearly due care is inconsistent with this standard.
If a defendant raises the statutory compliance defense, the court
must first determine if the defendant complied with the applicable
regulations. A finding of compliance with the regulations creates a
rebuttable presumption of due care. Therefore, after determining
compliance, the court must evaluate the circumstances surrounding
the research project to determine if circumstances exist that would
have caused a reasonable researcher to provide additional care. If
such circumstances exist, the court must make a second evaluation of
the researcher's conduct to ensure that additional precautions were
taken to protect the human subject from such circumstances. This step
requires the court to compare the conduct of the accused researcher to
105 Because federal IRB compliance is an extremely facts specific determination, this Note
cannot pinpoint the specific factors the court will utilize in making their determination in this
case because the specific facts of Professor Flynn's IRB approval and information about his
conduct during the study are not public record; see supra note 12.
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that of a reasonable researcher and determine if the accused provided
the necessary safeguards against the additional precautions.
In the situation where no such circumstance existed, a court that
finds that a defendant complied with IRB regulations, must also find
the defendant not liable for lIED. Compliance with federal regula-
tions creates a rebuttable presumption of due care and because no
circumstances requiring additional care existed, the presumption can-
not be rebutted. Therefore, compliance is evidence of due care, which
is inconsistent with the standard of conduct held liable under IIED.
Where circumstances requiring additional care did exist during the
research study, a court must make an additional determination beyond
compliance. The finding of such a circumstance rebuts the presump-
tion of due care, but as the Supreme Court in Ives held, a researcher is
only required to take additional precautions where such circumstances
exist and a reasonable person would have taken the additional precau-
tions. Therefore, the court must conduct a second analysis to deter-
mine if the researcher acted as a reasonable researcher would in the
given situation. If the court holds that the accused researcher acted as
a reasonable researcher, the court has indirectly found that the re-
searcher took the required additional precautions to protect human
subjects and therefore exercised due care. Again, since the court
found due care, it must dismiss any claim for lIED. To hold otherwise
will indirectly unravel the current IRB standards.
If the courts follow the outlined analysis, the IRB regulations and
the judicial system can work together to provide adequate protection
for human subjects. On the contrary, if the courts fail to follow this
analysis, the courts will undermine the IRB regulatory process by
determining that the IRB cannot sufficiently protect human subjects
from extreme and outrageous conduct. Undermining the IRB in this
way is "Outrageous!"'
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